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Hursh: Torts

TORTS
John G. Hursh
INTRODUCTION

During 1981 the Montana Supreme Court decided a number of
significant cases concerning Montana tort law. The developments
were primarily in the area of negligence, punitive damages and defamation. In particular, the court discussed the duty of care owed
to a business invitee by the occupier of land and the duty of care
of a general contractor to employees of his subcontractors. The
continued viability of the "sudden emergency doctrine" and the
"mere happening doctrine" in ordinary automobile accident cases
were also reviewed. The court clarified both the relationship between actual and punitive damage awards in negligence cases and
the effect of Montana's comparative negligence scheme on punitive
damage awards. In a defamation action the court defined the scope
of the "official proceeding" privilege as an affirmative defense. This
survey examines each of these opinions and their effect on Montana tort law.
I.

DUTY

OF

CARE

A. Accumulation of Ice and Snow
The Montana Supreme Court recently reviewed the duty of
care owed by the occupier of land to business invitees regarding
accumulations of ice and snow on the premises. In Cereck v. Albertson's, Inc.,1 the court held that a property owner may be liable
for falls on ice and snow where the property owner took affirmative
action with respect to the natural accumulation and thereby increased the natural hazard or created a new hazard, even where
such a condition is actually known or obvious.2
In Cereck, the plaintiff drove to the defendant's store to do
some shopping. She parked in the store's plowed parking lot. As a
result of the plowing there was a large snow bank between Mrs.
Cereck's car and the entrance to the store. Although a path had
been cut through the snow bank, there was a large puddle in the
path. Mrs. Cereck attempted to climb over the bank to avoid the
puddle, but in doing so she slipped and fell, and seriously injured
her leg and hip. She brought a damage action against the defendant alleging negligence in maintaining the parking lot.
1.

-

Mont.

-,

637 P.2d 509 (1981).

2. Id.
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The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the defendant owed no duty to the
plaintiff, a business invitee, because of the obvious nature of the
condition which caused the plaintiff's injury.3 After citing prior
Montana decisions 4 for the proposition that no liability may be imposed upon a landowner when the damage is created by natural
accumulations of ice or snow because their dangers are universally
known,' the supreme court nevertheless reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment because the defendant had taken affirmative action to alter the natural condition. The defendant's action, according to the court, created a jury question as to whether
the slippery condition was the result of natural accumulation or
the result of the defendant's carelessness."
Justice Morrison's concurring opinion 7 focuses on two troubling aspects of the majority opinion. The first involves the dichotomy between the potential liability of one who attempts to remedy
a dangerous condition created by the natural accumulation of ice
and snow, as compared to the freedom from liability of one who
makes no attempt to minimize the danger created by such natural
accumulations. Justice Morrison suggested a better rule: impose a
duty on a possessor of land to act prudently with regard to both
natural and unnatural accumulations of ice and snow.8 The second
aspect involves the court's apparent resurrection of categories of
injured parties for determining the liability of the possessor of the
land. Although the traditional rules of liability distinguish between
licensees, invitees and trespassers and the duty owed to each, 9 the
Montana court had previously indicated that a general duty of care
would be applied without regard to the status of the injured
party. 10 Cereck demonstrates that the different degrees of duty are
still retained."
3. Id.
4. Dunham v. Southside National Bank, 169 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d 1383 (1976); Luebeck
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 152 Mont. 88, 446 P.2d 921 (1968).
5. Mont. -, 637 P.2d at 511.
6. Id.; see, e.g., Willis v. St. Peter's Hospital, 157 Mont. 417, 486 P.2d 593 (1971).
7. Id. at -, 637 P.2d at 512.
8. Id. Justice Morrison pointed to RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965),
which provides:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious
to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge
or obviousness.
9. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 357 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
10. See Corrigan v. Janney, Mont. -,
626 P.2d 838 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Krone v. McCann, Mont. -,
P.2d -,
39 St. Rptr. 10 (1982).
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B.

General Contractors

12
In Stepanek v. Kober Construction,
the court addressed the
question of whether a general contractor owes a duty of care to the
employees of his subcontractors. The court held that if a general
contractor agrees to maintain and supervise job safety on the project in its contract with the owner, then that duty extends to employees of the subcontractor and cannot be delegated by the general contractor. 8
Defendant Kober Construction had a contract with Yellowstone County to build a recreational facility. The contract provided
that the defendant would be "responsible for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety precautions and programs" connected with the construction." Defendant's contracts with subcontractors contained a provision purporting to delegate the
responsibility for safety precautions to the subcontractor."
Plaintiff, an employee of the masonry subcontractor on the
project, was injured in a fall from the subcontractor's scaffolding
while doing masonry work. He brought this damage action against
the general contractor for breach of duty under the contract, the7
Montana Scaffolding Act's and Montana's Safe Place Statute.'
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
without stating the reasons therefor.

12. Mont. -,
625 P.2d 51 (1981).
13. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 55.
14. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 52.
15. The contract provision required the subcontractors to comply with all applicable
safety laws and to:
provide all safeguards, safety devices, and protective equipment and take any
other needed actions on his own responsibility; or as the contractor may determine reasonably necessary to protect the life and health of employees on the job
and the safety of the public and to protect property in connection with the performance of the work covered herein.
Id.
16. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 50-77-101 (1981)
provides:
All scaffolds erected in this state for use in the erection, repair, alteration, or
removal of buildings shall be well and safely supported, of sufficient width, and
properly secured so as to ensure the safety of persons working on them or passing
under them or by them and to prevent them from falling or to prevent any material that may be used, placed or deposited on them from falling.
17. MCA § 50-71-201 (1981) provides:
Every employer shall furnish a place of employment which is safe for employees therein and shall furnish and use and require the use of such safety devices
and safeguards and shall adopt and use such practices, means, methods, operations, and processes as are reasonably adequate to render the place of employment
safe and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life and
safety of employees.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1982
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The Montana court had previously recognized the general
rule"8 that a general contractor is not liable for injuries to a subcontractor's employees, unless the general contractor retains soxiie
control over the subcontractor's method of operation. 19 Relying on
this rule, the parties presented considerable evidence on whether
the defendant retained control over safety precautions or had delegated that responsibility to the subcontractor. After lengthy discussion, the supreme court held that the control issue was not dispositive in light of the safety provision in the contract between the
general contractor and Yellowstone County. The court had previously held that such contractual arrangements created a non-delegable duty of care that extended to persons not employed by the
subcontractors.2 0 In reversing the district court in Stepanek, the
court extended this non-delegable duty to cover the employees of
subcontractors.
The Montana court rejected the holding in West v. MorrisonKnadsen Co.,2 ' where the Ninth Circuit court held that the nondelegable duty extended to only third parties and not to employees
of subcontractors. The Montana Supreme Court supported its position by noting that West was decided before the passage of the
new Montana Constitution, which eliminated the distinctions between a subcontractor's employees and third parties.2
Stepanek may cause general contractors to be wary about entering into contracts that give them responsibility for job safety
precautions. Apparently, in the absence of a safety maintenance
provision or the exercise of actual control over subcontractor's operations, the general contractor will be shielded from liability to a
subcontractor's employee who is injured on the job.
Another interesting aspect of the court's opinion involves the
relationship between per se negligence and a violation of Occupational Health and Safety Act regulations. Although a violation of a
statute or ordinance intended to protect the plaintiff from an injury is generally considered negligence per se, s in Stepanek the
court held that the violation of safety regulations, such as those
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
19. Mont. -,
625 P.2d at 53 (quoting Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co.,
Mont. -,
593 P.2d 438, 441 (1979)).
20. Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (1932).
21. 451 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1971).
22. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 provides in pertinent part that "No person shall be
deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who hired him
23.

PROSSER,

supra note 9, at § 200.
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promulgated under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, did
not constitute negligence per se but were only evidence of
negligence.2 '
II.

A.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The Sudden Emergency Doctrine

The issue of the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine in automobile accident cases was once again before the Montana court in Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.2 Although the
court, in a four-three decision, rejected the doctrine's application
in Eslinger,it refused to signal the demise of the doctrine in every
negligence case, or even in every automobile case.2
Eslinger was a wrongful death action arising out of a highway
collision between decedents' automobile and a tractor-trailer
driven by defendant's employee. Road conditions were icy at the
time of the accident, and evidence at trial indicated that the driver
of the automobile had lost control of his vehicle prior to the collision. The truck driver slammed on his brakes and also lost control.
There was contradictory evidence on whether the collision occurred in defendant's or decedents' lane of traffic.
At the trial, the defendant's primary defense was that Eslinger's loss of control of his vehicle created an emergency and that
the truck driver's application of his brakes was an appropriate response under the circumstances.2 Over plaintiff's objection the
trial court gave the jury a sudden emergency instruction.2 The
jury returned a defense verdict. The plaintiff appealed on the
ground that the trial court erred in applying the sudden emergency
doctrine to the case.
The supreme court has recognized the sudden emergency doc24. Mont. -, 625 P.2d at 56. Contra, Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90
Wash. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).
25. Mont. -, 636 P.2d 254 (1981).
26. Id. at -, 636 P.2d at 260.
27. Id. at -, 636 P.2d at 256.
28. The trial court's instruction read:
A sudden emergency exists when the driver of a motor vehicle is suddenly
placed in a position of imminent peril, great mental stress, or danger which situation has not been brought about by his own negligence, but in which instant action is necessary to avoid a threatened danger. But the driver must use that care
which the ordinary prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances. One suddenly confronted with a peril through no fault of his own, who in
attempting to escape does not choose the best or safest way should not be held
negligent because of such choice, unless it was so hazardous that an ordinary prudent person would not have made [it] under similar circumstances.
Id. at -,
636 P.2d at 257.
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trine since at least 1927, when the court decided Peabody v.
Northern Pacific Railway Co."9 In Peabody the court stated the
rule as follows:
One who, in a sudden emergency, acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of want of time in which to form a judgment omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable
with negligence. Such .

.

. act or omission .

mistake, but not carelessness.8 0

.

. may be called a

The application of the doctrine in automobile accidents has
been considered by the court twice in the last few years,81 most
recently in the 1977 case of Kudrna v. Comet Corp." In Kudrna,
the court emphasized the limited application of the sudden emergency doctrine in negligence cases and cautioned trial courts,
stating:
Further, we entertain grave doubt whether a sudden emergency
charge should ever be given in an ordinary automobile accident
case. There is a modern view that it is argumentative, unnecessary, and confusing, and should be eliminated.33
In Kudrna the court's rejection of the doctrine was based on
facts indicating that the defendant created the emergency. In Eslinger the court remanded the case for a new trial, ruling that
under the circumstances of the case it was error to give the sudden
emergency instruction. The court recognized that in the operation
of a motor vehicle some emergencies must be anticipated, that
drivers must be prepared to meet those emergencies, and that the
sudden emergency doctrine would be inapplicable in those situations. s4 Trial courts were admonished not to give the instruction in
ordinary automobile accident cases and were told that the ordinary
rules of negligence afforded a sufficient gauge by which to appraise
conduct."

The court also pointed out that the doctrine is merely a particularization of the rule that the conduct required is that of a reasonable man under the same circumstances and that the emergency is but one of the circumstances a jury must consider."
29. 80 Mont. 492, 261 P. 261 (1927).
30. Id. at 497, 261 P. at 262.
31. See Erickson v. Perrett, 169 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074 (1976).
32. 175 Mont. 29, 572 P.2d 183 (1977).
33. Id. at -, 572 P.2d at 190 (quoting Fuler v. Wiley, 103 N.J. Super. 95, 103, 246
A.2d 715, 719 (1968) (emphasis supplied by the court)).
34.
35.

36.

-

Mont.

Id. at
Id.

-,

636 P.2d at 258.
636 P.2d at 260.

__,
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Despite the court's stated belief that a sudden emergency instruction is confusing to the jury, the doctrine is apparently still available in extraordinary automobile accidents as well as other negli37
gence cases.
B.

The Mere Happening Doctrine

For the third time in as many years the supreme court considered the use of the mere happening instruction in negligence cases.
In Sampson v. Snow,3 8 the court held that the instruction was a
proper statement of the law and was not grounds for reversal,3 9 but
the court again recommended that the instruction not be given in
the future because it can confuse the jury.'0
Sampson involved an automobile accident in which the plaintiff, a rural mail carrier, made a left turn off a busy street and was
struck by the defendant's vehicle as she attempted to pass the
plaintiff. The plaintiff brought a damage action for personal injuries sustained in the accident. Over plaintiff's objection the court
gave the jury the mere happening instruction, which reads:
The mere fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does
not give rise to legal inference that it was caused by negligence or
41
that any party to this action was negligent or otherwise at fault.
The jury returned a special verdict for the defendant, and the
plaintiff appealed, alleging that giving the instruction was reversible error.
In Sampson, the court noted that the instruction has been
given in numerous negligence cases since at least 1915,' 2 that it is a
correct statement of the law and, consequently, that it would be
unacceptable to hold that the jury should not be informed of this
rule of law.'3 In reaching its result the court reviewed two recent
4
Montana cases, Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation"
and Helmke v. Goff,45 in which the propriety of the instruction was
at issue. In Hunsaker, a 1978 case, the court considered the mere
happening instruction in a medical malpractice context, and al37. Justice Shea, in his concurring opinion in Eslinger, stated that "it is time for the
demise of the sudden emergency instruction in any situation." Id. at -, 636 P.2d at 261.
38.

-

Mont.

39. Id. at
40.

Id. at

,
-'

-,

632 P.2d 1122 (1981).

632 P.2d at 1125.
632 P.2d at 1124.

41. Id.
42. Id. at __, 632 P.2d at 1125. See Lyon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 50 Mont.
532, 148 P. 386 (1915).
43.

-

44.

179 Mont. 305, 588 P.2d 493 (1976).

45.

-

Mont.
Mont.

-,
-,

632 P.2d at 1125.
597 P.2d at 1131 (1979).
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though the instruction was upheld, the court concluded that in ordinary negligence cases the instruction should be given a "decent
burial. 14 6 The following year the Montana court reversed a jury's
verdict in Helmke,47 a res ipsa loquitur case, because the mere
happening instruction had been given. The Helmke court again
suggested that the instruction should be laid to rest in ordinary
negligence cases, but restricted its holding to res ipsa cases. 48
Last year's decision in Sampson v. Snow does not help to clarify the issue. The court again recommended that the mere happening instruction not be given even though, under the facts of Sampson, it was not reversible error to give it. The court, however,
implied that any failure to clearly and explicitly instruct the jury
on the acts or omissions that would constitute negligence, when
combined with a mere happening instruction, would constitute reversible error.49 The practical effect of the Sampson decision is to
maintain the status quo: defense attorneys will continue to offer
the instruction in ordinary negligence cases, judges will continue to
give it, and losing plaintiffs will continue to raise the issue on appeal in hope that under the facts of their case, the instruction will
be grounds for reversal.
III.
A.

DAMAGES

Actual and Punitive Damages

In Lauman v. Lee,50 the Montana Supreme Court was asked to
reverse a punitive damage award on the ground that the jury failed
to award actual or compensatory damages. In affirming the award
of punitive damages, the court held that as long as an identifiable
basis for actual damages exists, an award of punitive damages will
be upheld notwithstanding the jury's failure to fix a monetary
value on actual damages.5 1
Lauman involved an automobile accident in which the plain46. Id. at 328, 588 P.2d at 506-07. The Montana court quoted the California appellate
court's holding in Gagosian v. Burdick's Television & Appliances, 254 Cal. App. 2d 316, 62
Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (1967), which eliminated the mere happening instruction, stating:
Since it elucidates the obvious to the jury, and need not be given to meet any rule
of appellate procedure, we join heartily in the recommendation to its authors for
its "decent burial." The trial judge, who strikes the "mere happening" instruction
from his instruction book and completely crosses it from his memory will save
time in instruction and much in retrial after reversal.
47. Mont. -, 597 P.2d 1131 (1979).
48. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 1134.
49. Mont. -' 632 P.2d at 1126.
, 626 P.2d 830 (1981).
50. Mont.
51. Id. at _, 626 P.2d at 833.
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tiff's vehicle struck defendant's vehicle as plaintiff attempted to
turn left across defendant's lane of traffic. Defendant Lee's stepson
was driving defendant's automobile at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff claimed he could not see defendant's oncoming vehicle because its headlights were either not illuminated or were so obscured by mud as to be ineffective. Defendant Lee came to the
scene of the accident while the investigation was in progress. The
defendant began wiping mud off one of the headlights but the investigating officer ordered him to stop. When the officer stepped
away, the defendant backed up to his automobile and began wiping the other headlight. Because of the defendant's conduct the
officer was unable to test the illuminating characteristics of the
headlights.2
The plaintiff, who was seriously injured in the accident,
brought a damage action against the driver of the defendant's vehicle for negligence and against the defendant on a claim for exemplary or punitive damages. The jury found the driver of defendant's vehicle was not negligent, but it awarded $17,500 in punitive
damages against the defendant for his destruction of critical physical evidence. 5 The defendant appealed the award, contending that
the jury's failure to award actual damages precluded any award of
punitive damages.
The general rule in Montana, as in most jurisdictions," is that
an award of actual damages is a precondition to any award of exemplary damages.55 On at least two previous occasions, however,
the court has upheld punitive damage awards despite the jury's
failure to fix a monetary amount on actual damages. In one case
the court relied on the trial judge's finding of actual damages to
support the award. 5 In the other the court noted that the jury had
not been properly instructed on the law governing damage awards,
and speculated that if the jury had been properly instructed they
would have assessed actual damages.5
The Lauman court carried the law of punitive damages one
step further. In construing the Montana statutes on actual58 and
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at

__,

626 P.2d at 832.

Id.

PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 13-14.
See, e.g., Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mont. 75, 78, 214 P. 606, 607 (1923).
Miller v. Fox, 174 Mont.'504, 510, 571 P.2d 804, 808 (1977).
Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 241, 211 P.2d 420, 4271(1949).
MCA § 27-1-202 (1981) provides:
Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefore in money,
which is called damages.
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punitive damages, 59 it held that if there is an identifiable basis on
which actual damages could have been assessed, the failure of the
jury to assess actual damages will not preclude an award of exemplary damages.6 0 Although the Lauman jury was fully instructed
on damages and the judge made no finding of actual damages, the
supreme court believed that the dlefendant's wanton acts, which
deprived the plaintiff of the illumination tests, provided an identifiable basis for actual damages. 1 The court considered the issue of
actual damages impliedly resolved by the jury's award of punitive
damages. 2 Under Lauman, a jury can now assess punitive damages
without first assessing actual damages, provided an identifiable basis for actual damages exists.
B. Punitive Damages and Contributory Negligence
In Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
the Montana Supreme Court allowed a punitive damage
award of $80,000 against the defendant insurance company, because defendant's attorney mistakenly sued the plaintiff in a separate action. The court held that although the plaintiff was found to
be contributorily negligent, the trial court could not reduce the punitive damage award by the percentage of plaintiff's contributory
negligence."
Plaintiff's brother had been in an automobile accident with a
State Farm automobile insurance policyholder. Defendant State
Farm paid its insured and then exercised its subrogation rights to
bring an action against the plaintiff's brother. Defendant's attorney mistakenly sued the plaintiff, Shahram Shahrokhfar, instead
of plaintiff's brother, Bahram Shahrokhfar. Although the plaintiff
notified the defendant that it had sued the wrong person, the defendant took a default judgment against the plaintiff and subsequently had plaintiff's driver's license revoked. Plaintiff filed this
action for actual and punitive damages based on the negligence of
defendant and its attorney.
The jury, in answering a special jury verdict form, found the
Co.a8

MCA § 27-1-221 (1981) provides:
In an action for a breach of obligation not arising from contract where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the
jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant.
60. Mont. -, 626 P.2d at 833.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Mont.,
634 P.2d 653 (1981).
64. Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 658-59.
59.
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plaintiff 16 percent contributorily negligent. Actual damages were
set at $850 while punitive damages totalled $80,000. The trial
judge reduced both the actual and punitive damage awards by the
16 percent contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The defendant
appealed the judgment, alleging numerous errors by the trial court,
and the plaintiff cross-appealed, alleging only that the trial court
erred in reducing the punitive damage award. 6
After rejecting all defendant's allegations of error, the court
cited two federal district court decisions6 6 in support of its holding
that the trial court erred in reducing the punitive damage award. 7
In reaching the decision, the Montana court noted that since the
purpose of punitive damages is not compensatory, but is to punish
the defendant, there is no logical relationship between plaintiff's
conduct and the award of punitive damages. The only thing surprising about the decision is that the Montana Supreme Court appears to be the first appellate court in the nation to face this issue.
The court's decision in Shahrokhfar leaves in doubt the status
of the assumption of risk defense in Montana. Although the defendant claimed the plaintiff assumed the risk of the default judgment by failing to hire an attorney, the trial court refused to give
the jury the defendant's offered instruction on the defense. 8 The
supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing the instruction because there was no evidence on the
record that the plaintiff appreciated the risk of not obtaining legal
counsel. 9 The court cited a 1978 products liability case for a definition of assumption of risk 7 0 but did not mention the 1980 negligence case of Kopischke v. First Continental Corp.,7 1 in which the
court stated in dictum that, in the future, assumption of risk
would be treated like any other form of contributory negligence in
apportioning fault under Montana's comparative negligence statute.7 2 The court's comments in Shahrokhfar cast doubt on the apparently unequivocal position it took in Kopischke. Perhaps in the
near future the court will conclusively settle the issue of whether
assumption of risk is still a separate defense in negligence cases, or
65. Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 655-56.
66. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Tampa
Electric Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
67. Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 659.
68. Id.
69. Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 657-58.
70. Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1981).
71. Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., Mont. -,
610 P.2d 668 (1980). See Survey, 1980 Montana Supreme Court Tort Decisions, 42 MoNT.L. REv. 423, 428 (1981).
72. MCA § 27-1-702 (1981).
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if the plaintiff's subjective appreciation and assumption of risk is
merely a form of contributory negligence.
IV.

DEFAMATION

Skinner v. Pistoria7 provided the Montana Supreme Court
with an opportunity to define the scope of the official proceeding
privilege as a defense to a defamation claim. In construing Montana's privileged communication statute, 4 the court held that the
publication of defamatory matter in an official proceeding entitles
the speaker to absolute immunity from liability for defamation,
even though the speaker may have been motivated by actual
75
malice.
Defendant Paul Pistoria, an outspoken critic of Great Falls
city government, received numerous anonymous telephone calls in
which the callers alleged that certain members of the Great Falls
Police Department were misusing government funds. Defendant
wrote a letter to the Great Falls City Commission, Police Chief and
City Manager in which he named the police officers allegedly involved in the misconduct. Instead of mailing the letter, the defendant attended a regularly scheduled public meeting of the City
Commission and read the letter to the assembly. The defendant
made copies of the letter available to members of the press who
attended the meeting, and the content of the letter was subsequently reported in the media.
The plaintiff, one of the police officers accused in the letter,
was denied a promotion for approximately one year due to defendant's allegations, which were ultimately shown to be unfounded.
The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the defendant
alleging that the defendant was motivated by malice. The jury
agreed and awarded plaintiff $1,294 in actual damages and $25,000
in punitive damages. The defendant appealed the judgment, contending that the publication of the letter was a privileged commu73. Mont. -,
633 P.2d 672 (1981).
74. MCA § 27-1-804 (1981) provides:
A privileged communication is one made:
(1) in the proper discharge of an official duty;
(2) in any legislative or judicial proceeding or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) in a communication without malice to a person interested therein by one who
is also interested or by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as
to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication
innocent or who is requested by the person interested to give the information;
(4) by a fair and true report without malice of a judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding or of anything said in the course thereof.
75. Skinner, Mont. -,
633 P.2d at 675-76.
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which was cloaked with absolute immunity under Monnication, 76
tana law.

The general rule, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, is
that communications made to those who may be expected to take
official action for the protection of the public interest are entitled
to a qualified privilege.7 7 The distinction between a qualified privilege and an absolute privilege is that a qualified privilege is forfeited if publication is made with actual malice, whereas malice is
irrelevant if the privilege is absolute.78 The Montana court acknowledged that most jurisdictions had adopted a "qualified privilege" rule and noted that the absolute privilege could in some situations cause substantial injury.7 ' The court, however, looking to
the plain meaning of the language used in Montana's privileged
communication statute,' 0 decided that the legislature intended to
confer an absolute privilege on all publications made in an "official
proceeding authorized by law.""' Balancing the competing interests, the court commented that "[t]he advantages gained by the
the
freedom to comment and criticize are sufficient to outweigh
'' 2
danger that the reputation of public officers may suffer. s
While the court's construction of the privileged communication statute cannot be faulted, their holding could cause unnecessary and irreparable harm to diligent public servants. Presumably,
a person can now go before the proper official body, and with the
press in attendance, make malicious and unfounded accusations
about a public servant without being subjected to liability for
those defamatory remarks. 8

633 P.2d at 674.
76. Id. at -,
77. PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 791.
78. Id. at § 794.
633 P.2d at 676.
79. Mont. -,
80. MCA § 27-1-804 (1981). See supra note 74 for text of this statute.
633 P.2d at 675-76. The court noted that subsections (3) and (4) of
81. Mont ..
the privileged communication statute expressly require lack of malice in the publication of

defamatory matters, while subsections (1) and (2) of the statute, the "official duty" and
"official proceedings" privileges, are silent on the presence of malice. The court had previously held on the'same grounds that subsection (1) conferred an absolute privilege on communications made in the discharge of an official duty. Storch v. Board of Dir. of East Mont.
Reg. Five M.H.C., 169 Mont. 176, 181, 545 P.2d 644, 647 (1976).
82.

Skinner,

__

Mont.

-,

633 P.2d at 676.

83. Many jurisdictions have taken a more equitable position, which grants the speaker
a qualified privilege to present defamatory matters to the proper officials, and which raises a
rebuttable presumption that the publication was made in good faith. The defamation will be
actionable only if the aggrieved party can carry the burden of showing that the publication
was made with actual malice. See, e.g., Nuyen v. Slater, 372 Mich. 654, 127 N.W.2d 369
(1964); Dempsky v. Double, 386 Pa. 542, 126 A.2d 915 (1956).
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